The Cities of the Greek East after the First Mithridatic War. Aspects of Sulla’s Financial Policy by Rendina, Simone
Phasis 23, 2020 
 
THE CITIES OF THE GREEK EAST 
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ASPECTS OF SULLA’S FINANCIAL POLICY 
SIMONE RENDINA 
Abstract. The military results of Sulla’s war against Mithridates were in-
conclusive. Appian overlooked this fact, probably because his narrative of 
this war very much relied on the memoirs of Sulla himself or on a source 
that emphasized Sulla’s point of view. For the same reason, Appian did 
not really stress the harsh effects of the fines that Sulla imposed on many 
cities of the Greek East after the war. On the other hand, the end of the 
First Mithridatic War did contribute to the establishment of good relations 
among the Romans and notables from the Greek East, as has recently been 
claimed. By analyzing these facts, this paper reconstructs the aftermath of 
the First Mithridatic War and thus contributes to the reflections on the 
interaction between Rome and the Greek East. 
1. SULLA AND MITHRIDATES IN THE SOURCES 
Appian’s narrative of the First Mithridatic War (88-85 B.C.) terminates 
with his description of the conditions of the cities of Asia Minor. He 
also describes the measures Lucius Cornelius Sulla took in order to 
punish the cities that had been disloyal towards Rome before and dur-
ing that war. Appian also records that Sulla gave a speech in Ephesus 
shortly after the end of the war, in the winter of 85-84 B.C., which was 
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addressed to the most important citizens of the cities that had be-
trayed Rome.1 
The cities that were not punished were, of course, those cities that 
had been allied to Rome during the conflict, and, in some cases, had 
been punished by Mithridates for their loyalty to Rome. These cities 
were Ilion, Chios, the cities of Lycia, Rhodes, and Magnesia. To all 
these cities, Sulla granted freedom and the φιλία of the Roman peo-
ple.2 Sulla also took measures in order to restore the social order, 
which had been overturned by Mithridates, who had freed all the 
slaves in the cities of Asia Minor (App. Mith. 9.61). Sulla’s speech 
(App. Mith. 9.62) is immediately followed, in Appian’s text, by the 
description of the consequences of the measures taken by Sulla in Asia 
Minor (Mith. 9.63).  
Having settled the affairs of Asia, Sulla bestowed freedom on the 
inhabitants of Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Rhodes, Magnesia, and some 
others, either as a reward for their cooperation, or a recompense for 
what they had suffered from their loyalty to him, and inscribed 
them as friends of the Roman people. […] After this a proclamation 
was sent around commanding the principal citizens to come to 
Ephesus on a certain day to meet Sulla. When they had assembled 
 
1 For Sulla’s speech in Ephesus, see Campanile 2003; Santangelo 2007, 57, 107; 
Thein 2014, 172; Eckert 2016, 112. For the Ephesians’ allegiance to Mithridates 
during the initial phase of the First Mithridatic War and their eventual pun-
ishment by Sulla, see Mastrocinque 1999b, 89; Santangelo 2007, 108; Coudry 
and Kirbihler 2010, 50. According to Santangelo (2007, 117, 120-121) and Cou-
dry and Kirbihler (2010, 1, 20-22, 33, 78), Sulla formulated a Lex Cornelia, which 
was aimed at reorganising the province of Asia, shortly after that war.  
2 App. Mith. 9.61: ἢ συμμαχίας ἀμειβόμενος, ἢ ὧν διὰ προθυμίαν ἐπεπόνθεσαν 
οὗ ἕνεκα, ἐλευθέρους ἠφίει καὶ Ῥωμαίων ἀνέγραφε φίλους. (“Sulla bestowed 
freedom [...], either as a reward for their cooperation, or a recompense for what 
they had suffered from their loyalty to him, and inscribed them as friends of the 
Roman people“). All translations from Appian in this paper are by H. White. See 
Dowling 2000, 319, 330; Santangelo 2007, 108; Eckert 2016, 112. The aforementioned 
city of Magnesia was Magnesia ad Sipylum: see Mastrocinque 1999b, 88; Santange-
lo 2007, 108.  
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Sulla addressed them from the tribune as follows: “We first came to 
Asia with an army when Antiochus, king of Syria, was despoiling 
you. We drove him out and fixed the boundaries of his dominions 
beyond the river Halys and Mount Taurus. […] I shall only impose 
upon you the taxes of five years, to be paid at once, together with 
what the war has cost me, and whatever else may be spent in set-
tling the affairs of the province. I will apportion these charges to 
each of you according to cities, and will fix the time of payment. 
Upon the disobedient I shall visit punishment as upon enemies.” 
After he had thus spoken Sulla apportioned the fine to the dele-
gates and sent men to collect the money. The cities, oppressed by 
poverty, borrowed it at high rates of interest and mortgaged their 
theatres, their gymnasiums, their walls, their harbours, and every 
other scrap of public property, being urged on by the soldiers with 
contumely. Thus was the money collected and brought to Sulla. 
The province of Asia had her fill of misery (App. Mith. 9.61-63). 
This passage is key to understanding Roman imperialism, especial-
ly its economic aspects.3 Sulla tried to explain the reasons for the Ro-
man expansion and its economic consequences on Asia Minor, by 
taking into account the age from the Treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.) 
until the age in which he was living. The Roman authorities are 
shown to have been very positive towards Asia Minor, where they 
established solid political and social conditions. Sulla’s attitude to-
wards his audience, however, had him overlook some ambiguous 
aspects of the Roman conquests in that area. For example, he did not 
mention the fact (of which we are aware through Polybius) that the 
concession of Lycia to Rhodes was interpreted differently by the in-
habitants of Lycia and Rhodes.4 While the Rhodians had been con-
vinced that Lycia belonged to them until the end of the Third Mace-
 
3 Another key document is the text of the speech that Sulla is supposed to have 
addressed to Mithridates (App. Mith. 8.57-58), which narrates the Romans’ 
initial decision not to administer Phrygia, Mithridates’ aggressive foreign poli-
cy (aimed at destroying the Roman power), his liberation of slaves and cancel-
lation of debts, and his massacre of the Romans and Italians.  
4 Polyb. 22.5.1-10. 
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donian War, Sulla declared in his speech that the Lycians had been 
freed by the Romans very soon. This is what Sulla declared in the 
speech he gave in Ephesus, as far as the Treaty of Apamea and later 
events were concerned:  
We did not retain possession of you when you had become our 
subjects instead of his, but set you free, except that we awarded a 
few places to Eumenes and the Rhodians, our allies in the war, not 
as tributaries (ὑποτελεῖς), but as clients (ἐπὶ προστάταις). A proof 
of this is that when the Lycians complained of the Rhodians we 
freed them from the authority of Rhodes (App. Mith. 9.62).5  
As recorded by Appian (Mith. 9.62), the Romans inflicted a collec-
tive punishment, i.e. upon each one of the rebel cities (κοινήν). How-
ever, each city had to undergo a different treatment (διαιρήσω δὲ 
ταῦθ’ ἑκάστοις ἐγὼ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τάξω προθεσμίαν ταῖς 
ἐσφοραῖς). Sulla’s measures generally consisted of forcing the cities to 
pay five years of taxes. Those taxes had to be paid αὐτίκα (“at once”). 
In addition, the cities had to compensate in monetary terms for the 
cost of the war against Mithridates to Sulla (τὴν τοῦ πολέμου 
δαπάνην, ὅση τε γέγονέ μοι), and for whatever the establishment of 
the province might cost (καὶ ἔσται καθισταμένῳ τὰ ὑπόλοιπα).  
In Appian’s text, the end of the First Mithridatic War is presented as 
a crucial moment as well as being a perfect opportunity to draw con-
clusions on Roman policy in the Greek East.6 Appian was not the only 
historian who had this attitude towards this historical event. Cicero 
also considered Sulla’s policy in the Greek East as a turning point in 
the relations between Rome and the eastern provinces, as is demon-
strated by a passage from De officiis (2.26-27), where Sulla’s policy is 
presented as the end of the previous form of dependence of the rest of 
 
5 For the loyalty of Rhodes to the Romans, see Santangelo 2007, 31. 
6 From this point of view, these passages by Appian can be compared to Mith-
ridates’ letter to King Arsaces, in Sall. Hist. 4.69 M. This is another summary of 
the key events of the Roman expansion before the First Mithridatic War. This 
text, too, especially refers to the conditions of Asia Minor. For the ideological 
aspects of Mithridates’ hostility towards the Romans, see Gabba 1990, 213-215.  
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the world on Rome (patrocinium) and as the beginning of a new and 
stronger form of command (imperium).  
The consequences of Sulla’s fiscal policy were soon clear: the cities, 
oppressed by poverty, obtained loans with a very high interest rate 
from moneylenders and mortgaged the public buildings, due to the 
pressure exerted by the soldiers (App. Mith. 9.63).  
Appian’s source for the information he gave in these passages is not 
known with certainty. The part of Mithridaticus dedicated to Sulla’s 
expedition possibly owes much material to Sulla’s memoirs, or to 
some historian who was sympathetic towards Sulla, such as Sisenna.7 
The speeches that Sulla gave to Archelaus, Mithridates’ general, and to 
Mithridates himself (App. Mith. 54, 57), are self-legitimizing, especially 
in the passages that raised some questions concerning Sulla’s own 
legal status in Asia Minor.  
Another important expression of an attitude in favour of Sulla is the 
way Appian narrates some events involving Gaius Flavius Fimbria. 
Fimbria was an enemy of Sulla. At first, Appian presents him as a 
skilled and willing collaborator of Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who had 
been chosen as the leader of the expedition against Mithridates, and 
who was a supporter of Gaius Marius (Mith. 8.51). Fimbria also ac-
complished some successful military operations (Mith. 8.52). However, 
later his ambitions got the better of him.8 Using a source favourable to 
Sulla, Appian presents Fimbria as if he had been the killer of Flaccus, 
and as if he had usurped Flaccus’ role in the expedition against Mith-
ridates (Mith. 8.52). On the other hand, Livy and Strabo seem to be 
more favourable to Fimbria, and stress the fact that he held a formal 
office. He was Lucius Valerius Flaccus’ legatus, according to Livy (Per. 
82), and he was his quaestor, according to Strabo (13.1.27 = 594).9  
Before Gaius Flavius Fimbria died, his behaviour became somewhat 
undignified: he was forced to ask for help from his soldiers, one by one, 
and to persuade them to “fight against their fellow-citizens” (App. Mith. 
 
7 For this problem, see Mastrocinque 1999a, 59-75.  
8 See Santangelo 2007, 33, for Fimbria’s feats and his eventual failure. 
9 See Mastrocinque 1999a, 60.  
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9.59). He also paid a slave in order to have Sulla assassinated. Finally, 
Fimbria committed suicide. Sulla did not insult Fimbria’s corpse, but ra-
ther treated it respectfully – contrary to what Cinna and Marius did to the 
corpses of their dead enemies (App. Mith. 9.60).  
Appian thus makes Sulla appear as the only true hero of the expedi-
tion against Mithridates. In his heroism, Sulla also had to bear the de-
struction of his own properties and the murder of his own friends in 
Rome, in addition to being declared a public enemy of the Roman 
people (Mith. 8.51).  
Appian’s narrative of Sulla’s siege and storming of Athens in 86 B.C. 
shows similar features to those mentioned above with regard to his treat-
ment of the cities of Asia: Sulla did slaughter many of its inhabitants, but 
also pardoned the rest of them; he allowed the soldiers to plunder Athens, 
but forbade the burning of the city (App. Mith. 6.38-39).10 According to 
Appian, Sulla’s punishment of Athens was not excessive. 
The chapters of Appian’s Mithridaticus concerning Sulla’s war against 
Mithridates are, overall, an attempt to eliminate the blame that could 
have been put on Sulla because he had seized the command of the war 
from the followers of Marius, and he had thus prevented them from 
ending the war and vanquishing Mithridates.11 Sources also record that 
after the Peace of Dardanos (85 B.C.) it was presumed that a new war 
was approaching.12 Sulla’s obstructionism was especially clear when 
 
10 For the siege and sack of Athens by Sulla, see Thein 2014, 170-171; Eckert 
2016, 86-102; Kuin 2018, 617, 634 (“Appian does not emphasize the looting that 
took place after the siege of Athens”).  
11 Santangelo 2007, 8: “Sulla’s decision was by no means ill-founded. He need-
ed to hasten his return to Italy and to concentrate his energies on the imminent 
confrontation with his enemies.” (See also p. 117); Thein 2014, 176-177; Eckert 
2016, 115.  
12 See Sall. Hist. 1.32 M: Quis rebus Sulla suspectis maximeque ferocia regis Mithri-
datis in tempore bellaturi. Flor. 1.40.3.11: Et debellatum foret, nisi de Mithridate 
triumphare cito, quam vere maluisset. In the first case, it would be interesting to 
ascertain whether Sallust was using documents written immediately after the 
First Mithridatic War or his observation was simply ex eventu. See Mastro-
cinque 1999a, 64. Will (1979-1982, II: 485) seems to overestimate the extent of 
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Mithridates was caught up in a siege in Pitane by Fimbria, and Sulla 
interrupted the siege.13 Sulla also needed to justify his quick return to 
Italy, where the civil war was about to reignite. He thus hurriedly 
agreed with Mithridates on a peace, the terms of which were very fa-
vourable to the King.14 On the other hand, leniency towards Mithridates 
may have been justified by the fact that the Romans (especially Manius 
Aquilius) were also responsible for the outbreak of the war.15 
While Plutarch (Sull. 24.7) claims Sulla’s soldiers made a complaint 
about the lightness of Mithridates’ punishment, Appian seems to justi-
fy Sulla’s attitude towards Mithridates, by highlighting the impossibil-
ity of Sulla conducting the war until Mithridates’ final defeat. Appian 
stresses the fact that Sulla managed to accomplish several military 
operations in Asia Minor against all odds: “Sulla had no ships; […] his 
enemies at Rome had sent him no money, nor anything else, but had 
declared him an outlaw” (App. Mith. 54).16  
Plutarch was an author who stressed the negative effects of Sulla’s 
economic innovations. Plutarch notes Sulla’s ruthlessness and high-
lights the economic consequences of Sulla’s punishment of the cities of 
Asia Minor. As Plut. Sull. 25.4-5 records, “Sulla imposed upon Asia a 
 
Sulla’s victory: “Paix coûteuse pour Mithridate, obligé d’accepter toutes les 
conditions de Sulla, à savoir, pour l’essentiel, l’évacuation de tout ce qu’il avait 
conquis en Asie Mineure.“  
13 Liv. Per. 83: Fl. Fimbria in Asia fusis proelio aliquot praefectis Mithridatis urbem 
Pergamum cepit obsessumque regem non multum afuit quin caperet. Urbem Ilium, 
quae se potestati Syllae reservabat, expugnavit ac delevit et magnam partem Asiae 
recepit. Although Livy here seems to acknowledge Fimbria’s valour, he had 
previously defined him as a ultimae audaciae homo (Per. 82). Cf. App. Mith. 8.52 
on Mithridates being sieged in Pitane and on his escape to Mytilene. See Plut. 
Sert. 23.6 on Fimbria’s reconquest of Asia; Plut. Sull. 23; and Oros. 6.2.9.  
14 In addition, as Plut. Sull. 23.1-5 mentions, Sulla was accused of giving 10,000 
plethra to Mithridates in Euboea and the title of friend and ally of the Romans 
shortly before the Peace of Dardanos.  
15 For the relations between Rome and Mithridates until 89 B.C., see Harris 
1979, 273. 
16 See also App. Mith. 56 for some difficulties Sulla overcame during the expedition.  
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collective (κοινῇ) fine of 20,000 talents and ruined the private patri-
monies of individuals with the arrogance and rapacity of the soldiers 
who were lodged at their houses. Every master of a house was forced 
to pay to his lodger four tetradrachms every day and feed him and 
any friends that the lodger decided to invite. On the other hand, an 
official had to receive fifty drachmae, clothes for staying at home, and 
clothes for going out to the square.”  
This passage is crucial for understanding the quantitative data of the 
financial punishment inflicted upon the Greeks of Asia Minor. This 
sum of money is also confirmed by other passages in Plutarch’s Lucul-
lus at 4.1 (“once peace had been established, Mithridates sailed to the 
Euxine Pontus, while Sulla fined Asia 20,000 talents”) and at 20.4 
(“that debt originated from the 20,000 talents of the fine that Sulla im-
posed on Asia. Twice as much was paid to moneylenders, who had 
already raised the sum to 120,000 talents, due to the interest”). In the 
latter chapter, Plutarch describes the disastrous conditions of the prov-
ince of Asia due to the unethical practices of the moneylenders (Luc. 
20.1-2).  
Exactly why 20,000 talents had to be paid is still an open issue. It is 
not clear whether the sum of 20,000 talents mentioned by Plutarch 
included both the arrears of the missing years of taxes (corresponding 
to the First Mithridatic War, 88-85 B.C.) plus the indemnity of the cost 
of the war, or just the indemnity alone.17 In any case, this sum was ex-
tremely high compared to the war reparations that Rome forced other 
defeated enemies to pay: for example, at the end of the Second Punic 
War, Carthage was forced to pay the Romans 3,200 talents, 1,000 of 
which had to be paid immediately;18 the indemnity Antiochus III had 
to pay according to the Treaty of Apamea consisted of 15,000 talents.19 
 
17 This discussion was quite intense between the 19th and the 20th centuries, and 
was summarized by Rostovtzeff 1966-1980, III: chap. 7, 17 n. 30. For the finan-
cial implications of the reconquest of Asia Minor by Sulla, see Mastrocinque 
1999b, 87; Santangelo 2007, 5, 58, 111-112, 114, 124, 227; Thein 2014, 183; Eckert 
2016, 116-117; Delrieux 2010, para. 8-9. 
18 Polyb. 1.62.8-9; 1.63.3; 3.27.5. 
19 Polyb. 21.43.19; Liv. 38.38. 
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Mithridates, who bore the greatest responsibility for the war, was also 
forced to pay a fine according to the terms of the Peace of Dardanos (85 
B.C.). According to Plutarch, it was 2,000 talents, namely one-tenth of 
the sum that the whole province of Asia had to pay. In addition, Mithri-
dates had to leave Asia and to deliver seventy ships (Plut. Sull. 22.9). 
The exact sum is not mentioned by Granius Licinianus. However, Gra-
nius does mention the request of delivering seventy decked ships (35.77, 
p. 21, ed. N. Criniti), which seems in line with what Plutarch reported. 
As B. Scardigli rightly observes in her commentary on this passage by 
Granius, the sum reported by Plutarch (2,000 talents) appears to be very 
low, as the island of Chios had been asked for the same amount by 
Mithridates during the war (App. Mith. 47).20  
The historian Memnon of Heraclea tells a slightly different story and 
mentions a fine that Mithridates had to pay consisting of 3,000 talents 
and 80 ships.21 Whether Plutarch or Memnon is right, the sum that 
Mithridates had to pay was very low compared to the much higher 
sum that Sulla made the cities of Asia Minor give to the Romans.22 In 
fact, Mithridates had much greater leverage than the cities. Since the 
results of the war were still inconclusive, Mithridates’ agreement was 
crucial for stopping the war, while the cities had much less bargaining 
power. Since the war was not over yet and Sulla tried to make the 
most of his temporary military superiority, it is perhaps difficult to 
suppose that he subjected the cities of Asia to a planned and consistent 
financial policy.23 
 
20 Scardigli 1983, ad loc. 
21 FGrHist 434 F 1.25: βεβαιωθῆναι δὲ Μιθριδάτῃ τοῦ Πόντου παντὸς τὴν 
βασιλείαν, παρασχεῖν δὲ ἰδίως Σύλλᾳ τριήρεις πʹ καὶ τάλαντα τρισχίλια 
πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥώμην κάθοδον (“that the kingdom of Pontos in its 
entirety would be secured for Mithridates, that Mithridates would provide 
specifically to Sulla eighty triremes and three thousand talents for his own 
return to Rome from exile.” Trans. Keaveney and Madden). See Eckert 2016, 
115, 119. 
22 Santangelo 2007, 114. 
23 For the Romans’ attitude towards the future (on which their ability to con-
duct a consistent economic policy would depend), see Shaw 2019.  
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At first, before the final terms of the Peace of Dardanos were decid-
ed, Sulla proposed to Archelaus that Mithridates should indemnify all 
the expenses of the war (App. Mith. 55). The final agreement, however, 
was far more favourable towards Mithridates. In fact, the Peace of 
Dardanos was a private agreement and its terms were never written 
down, nor was the Peace formally ratified in Rome by the Senate, due 
to Sulla’s exceptional position of power (App. Mith. 64)24. Sulla’s unor-
thodox control of Asia Minor, which was pacified by means of unoffi-
cial agreements, might thus have allowed the Roman winners to arbi-
trarily collect tributes and reimbursements. The Roman soldiers’ dis-
satisfaction with the light punishment of Mithridates (Plut. Sull. 24.7) 
was balanced by the leeway they had in Asia Minor after the war. It 
was, of course, Sulla who gave them this freedom of action (Plut. Sull. 
25.4-5). 
2. SULLA AND THE CITIES OF THE GREEK EAST 
The economy of the cities of Asia Minor was heavily damaged after 
the First Mithridatic War. Lucius Cornelius Sulla needed large sums of 
money in order to conduct the upcoming civil war, and to satisfy the 
needs of his soldiers.25  
Tax collection was generally farmed out to publicani. However, there are 
no witnesses to the presence of publicani in Asia Minor immediately after 
the conflict ended. There is actually no mention of publicani in Plutarch or 
in Appian (in Mith. 9.63, there is just a reference to the pressure exerted by 
the soldiers in order to obtain the money, σὺν ὕβρει στρατιωτῶν 
ἐπειγόντων). A heavy load of taxes and fines was imposed on a large 
number of cities, with the exception of Ilion, Chios, the cities of Lycia, 
 
24 πρέσβεσιν αὐτοῦ, τὰς συνθήκας προτείνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφη συνθήκας ὁρᾶν· 
οὐ γὰρ συνεγέγραπτο Σύλλας, ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ τὰ λεχθέντα βεβαιώσας 
ἀπήλλακτο. (“When the [king’s] ambassadors appealed to the treaty he re-
plied that he saw no treaty; for Sulla had not written it out, but had gone away 
after seeing what he proposed orally carried out in fact”). See Kallet-Marx 
1995, 263; Santangelo 2007, 114 n. 31.  
25 See Campanile 1996.  
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Rhodes, and Magnesia,26 along with those cities that had acquired free-
dom and immunitas and which are mentioned by Cicero.27  
As mentioned above, the Greek cities initially had to pay 20,000 tal-
ents to the Romans. This sum ended up being multiplied by six in the 
following years, due to the interest to be paid to moneylenders, until it 
became 120,000 talents (Plut. Luc. 20.4). Meanwhile, as already men-
tioned, Mithridates had to pay only 2,000 talents: thus, the cities had to 
pay a much higher sum than Mithridates. The distress of the Greeks 
was great, as Plutarch observed (Luc. 20.1-2).  
The reason why Sulla did not ask for the help of the publicani in order to 
collect taxes in Asia Minor is not completely clear. P. A. Brunt argued that 
a basic aspect of the Roman economy, such as the activity of the tax-
farmers, was impossible to eliminate.28 It would thus be unlikely that Sulla 
excluded the publicani from collecting taxes in Asia Minor due to his hos-
tility towards the equestrian order, to which the publicani generally be-
longed. It seems probable that during the Asiatic Vespers of 88 B.C., many 
of these tax-farmers were assassinated, and that many others escaped 
from Asia Minor. However, the publicani were temporarily replaced by 
the Roman soldiers billeted in the province.29  
Inscriptions provide a terminus ante quem for the return of the tax-
farmers to Asia Minor, as the locatio of vectigalia to the publicani is men-
tioned in the Senatus consultum de Asclepiade Clazomenio sociisque of 78 
B.C. (line 16 of the Latin text = line 23 of the Greek text).30 Another tes-
 
26 See Campanile 1996.  
27 Cic. Off. 3.87: quas civitates L. Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberavis-
set, ut eae rursus vectigales essent. See Mastrocinque 1999b; Eckert 2016, 113-114. 
One of these cities was Smyrne according to Mastrocinque 1999b, 89-92.  
28 Brunt 1956. 
29 For the Asiatic Vespers, see Santangelo 2007, 5, 32; Bowersock 2013, 378; 
Kuin 2018, 617. For the absence of publicani in Asia Minor after the First Mith-
ridatic War, see Mastrocinque 1999b, 87; Santangelo 2007, 113, 124. 
30 See Brunt 1956, 21; Raggi 2001; Santangelo 2007, 56. The city of Clazomenae, 
from which Asclepiades came, had already been subject to Rome before the 
war, and remained in that condition after Sulla’s reconquest of Asia Minor: see 
Santangelo 2007, 122.  
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timony to this event is provided by a passage written by Memnon of 
Heraclea on the presence of Roman publicani in Bithynia in 74 B.C. 
(FGrHist 434 F 1.27.5-6).  
Although the people of the province of Asia (not including Mithri-
dates) were the scapegoat for the First Mithridatic War, not every city 
and social class was punished by Sulla. There were two kinds of fa-
vourable conditions: those attributed to certain cities, and, as F. San-
tangelo observed, there were individual members of the social strata 
who had prestige and managed to reach privileges and high positions 
through their connection to Roman magistrates,31 for example, Ascle-
piades and his socii in the already mentioned Senatus consultum de As-
clepiade. Asclepiades and his associates managed to obtain fiscal im-
munity and judicial privileges in the difficult years following the First 
Mithridatic War, even though they were never awarded the Roman 
citizenship.32  
However, a prejudice aganist the Greeks of Asia was still alive in the 
following decades. J. Thornton has stressed the lasting influence of the 
attitude of Cicero, who in the Pro Flacco, separated the Greeks who 
had supported Mithridates from those who had fought against him. 
This was a way of making some of them feel guilty for their fellow 
citizens’ crimes and thus making them more submissive towards 
Rome.33 The followers of Mithridates were presented as members of 
the lower classes, and his enemies as members of the upper classes. 
This enabled Cicero to be gracious towards the inhabitants of Asia 
Minor who were his personal allies, and to accuse his personal ene-
mies of having been the accomplices of Mithridates in the Asiatic Ves-
pers.34 This was probably not the case, since also most of the Greek 
elites initially saw Mithridates as a liberator, and were later let down 
by him, especially when he started cancelling their borrowers’ debts 
and freeing their slaves.  
 
31 Santangelo 2007, 65, 128, 132.  
32 Santangelo 2007, 56.  
33 Thornton 1998, 291ff.; Santangelo 2007, 126. 
34 See, for example, Cic. Flac. 52, 57-60.  
 SIMONE RENDINA 
 
86 
Many members of the upper classes who initially supported Mithri-
dates were based in Magnesia, Ephesus, and Mytilene.35 The attitude 
of some communities towards Mithridates was mixed. Pergamon was 
initially pro-Mithridatic.36 A plot against Mithridates later took place 
in that city.37 However, in the same city there also lived a man called 
Mithridates of Pergamon, who had been initially educated at the court 
of Mithridates and was considered to be his illegitimate son, but 
would later become a supporter of the Romans and a friend of Julius 
Caesar.38 Pergamon was also the capital of Mithridates’ reign in Asia 
Minor, and was his shelter during a critical phase of his first war 
against the Romans.39  
Sulla’s reaction to the Greek communities depended on whether 
they had supported Mithridates or fought against him. Some cities 
received favours and fiscal privileges in return for their loyalty during 
the war; Rhodes, for instance, obtained the city of Caunos back from 
the Romans.40 The finances of Stratonicea had been heavily damaged 
during the First Mithridatic War (App. Mith. 3.21, 12.82). However, 
Stratonicea was helped in recovering the goods lost during the war by 
a senatus consultum (RDGE 18, ll. 60-63; 114-118). Ilion, Chios, the cities 
of Lycia, and Magnesia were freed again and obtained the friendship 
of the Roman people (App. Mith. 9.61). In particular, Chios received 
proof of Sulla’s benevolence through the concession of freedom and 
autonomy, even as far as judicial matters were concerned.41 Ilion had 
been severely damaged by Gaius Flavius Fimbria during the conflict 
between him and Sulla (App. Mith. 8.53). The privileged treatment of 
 
35 App. Mith. 21; SIG3 742 of 85 B.C., ll. 9-14. 
36 For the punishment of Pergamon by Sulla, see Santangelo 2007, 60.  
37 App. Mith. 48.  
38 Str. 13.4.3 = 625c; BAlex. 78.1-2. See Arrayás Morales 2010, 383; Bowersock 
2013, 380.  
39 Plut. Sull. 11; App. Mith. 52. 
40 Cic. QFr. 1.1.33; Str. 14.2.3 = 651. Caunos had been a point of contention since 
the end of the Third Macedonian War. For Rome’s treatment of Caunos, see 
Delrieux 2010, para. 4, 11. 
41 See SIG3 785. 
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Ilion by the Romans, however, may have also been encouraged for 
cultural reasons, such as the Trojan legend and its connection with 
Rome. However, in around 70 B.C., Ilion was still not in a good eco-
nomic state.42 Finally, some other cities were treated with leniency be-
cause their leaders had given large sums of money to Sulla under the 
counter (Cic. Off. 3.87). 
Some favours bestowed by the Romans were justified by cultural or 
religious aspects. For example, Sulla aided the technitai of Dionysus 
(artists devoted to Dionysus) in Ionia and in the Hellespont (in around 
84-81 B.C.) with tax exemptions.43 Sulla also rewarded some temples, 
such as that of Hecate at Lagina, near Stratonicea, in Caria, to which he 
attributed the asylia.44 However, the region of Caria had in any case 
generally been loyal to Rome.45 Another sanctuary that Sulla was 
magnanimous towards was the temple of Daulis, in Phocaea.46 But not 
all the temples received such treatment. In fact, the temples of Epi-
daurus and of Olympia in Greece were exploited by Sulla as he need-
ed money in order to conduct the siege of Athens (86 B.C.).47 Sulla also 
had a strong connection to the temple of Aphrodite in Aphrodisias, in 
Caria (App. B Civ. 1.97-98), and to that of Isis and Serapis in 
Mopsuestia, in Cilicia. To these two sanctuaries, Sulla had already 
conferred the privilege of asylia during his governorship of Cilicia (96-
93 B.C.).48 Sulla also consulted the Oracle of Delphi, with which he had 
 
42 See IvIlion 10, ll. 13-19, block A; IvIlion 71. For the destruction of Ilion by 
Fimbria and its economic conditions, see Santangelo 2007, 58; Thein 2014, 171-
172, 179. 
43 RDGE 49; Le Guen 2001, 56, B, ll. 8-13.  
44 SC de Stratonicensibus, RDGE 18, ll. 113-118. See Santangelo 2007, 51. 
45 See, for example, the case of Aphrodisias in App. B Civ. 1.97-98; Reynolds 
1982, No. 5; Marek 1988; Santangelo 2007, 130; Delrieux 2010, para. 17. For the 
loyalty of Caria to the Romans, see Santangelo 2007, 50. 
46 SEG 1.175. See Santangelo 2007, 52.  
47 Plut. Sull. 12, 5ff.; App. Mith. 54.  
48 SEG 44.1227. Sulla also granted full fiscal immunity to the shrine of Amphi-
araos near Oropos (RDGE 23). See Santangelo 2007, 201ff. For Sulla’s governor-
ship of Cilicia, see Santangelo 2007, 3. 
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a tight relationship.49 Sulla’s attitude with regards to temples shows 
his complex behaviour towards the Greek world: he had as many al-
lies in the Greek East as enemies and he presumably developed tight 
connections to key figures in the temples. 
Jones, Thornton, and Santangelo highlighted how good relations 
were formed between the Greek elites and Rome after the end of the 
First Mithridatic War.50 Inscriptions show that during the following 
decades many Greek notables, who were sent on diplomatic missions 
to the Roman senate and to Roman magistrates, often obtained finan-
cial concessions for their own cities.  
Because of the harsh financial measures that Sulla imposed on the 
cities of Asia, the members of the elites in Asia Minor needed to forge 
connections with members of the Roman elite and thus seek support. 
In the years between the Peace of Dardanos and the Third Mithridatic 
War, there was indeed an “intense diplomatic activity directed by Asia 
to Rome and the Roman magistrates in the province.”51 One aspect 
that is generally not emphasized, however, is that at least one of the 
people who was sent to Rome as an envoy, i.e. Xenocles of 
Adramyttium, was accused of being sympathetic towards Mithridates 
(μιθριδατισμός) since he defended the cities of Asia Minor in the Ro-
man Senate. In fact, Xenocles is known from a passage of Strabo who 
mentioned Xenocles’ speech in the Senate in defence of the cities of 
Asia Minor and in defence against the accusations he had received 
 
49 Santangelo 2007, 50, 52, 207-209. 
50 For the Roman patronage of Greek communities after the First Mithridatic 
War and the local elites’ increasing search for support of the members of the 
Roman elite, see Jones 1974, 204-205; Thornton 1998, 302; Santangelo 2007, 65, 
128, 132; Arrayás Morales 2010; Delrieux 2010, para. 17, 20-23. 
51 Jones 1974, 203. One example that sheds light on the attitude of the Greek 
elites towards the Romans in that period is that of Diodorus Pasparos. For 
Diodorus, see Jones 1974; Virgilio 1994; Jones 2000; Santangelo 2007, 61; Ar-
rayás Morales 2010, 379-381; Coudry and Kirbihler 2010, para. 44. Before Jones’ 
article (1974), it was still debated whether Diodorus began to be active after the 
First Mithridatic War, or much earlier, i.e. shortly after the Romans’ war 
against Aristonicus of Pergamon.  
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(Str. 13.1.66 = 614). Xenocles is also mentioned as a former teacher of 
rhetoric of Cicero (a few years after the end of the First Mithridatic 
War) in the latter’s Brutus (316). What we know about Xenocles high-
lights once again the type of connections that formed between Rome 
and the Greeks of Asia Minor after the First Mithridatic War. The Ro-
mans ultimately developed good relations with the Greeks, although 
the diplomacy between Greeks and Romans was sometimes damaged 
by the suspicion many Romans had of the Greeks, as a long-term con-
sequence of the massacre that had happened in the Asiatic Vespers, as 
demonstrated by Cicero’s Pro Flacco.52 
Another case of members of the elites in Asia Minor going to Rome 
as ambassadors is that of Diodorus Zonas, an orator who “many times 
defended Asia, and at the time of the attack of King Mithridates was 
accused of trying to provoke a rebellion against Mithridates by the 
cities; however, he defended himself and was exonerated from the 
calumnies.”53 It is possible that this orator provoked an insurgence 
against Mithridates because he had always been a supporter of the 
Romans.54 In the Greek East, in any case, being connected to Mithrida-
tes would later become the proof of the prestige that could be dis-
played by Greek notables along with one’s good relations to the Ro-
mans, as G. W. Bowersock has recently demonstrated with regards to 
Strabo’s narrative of his own family history.55 
The First Mithridatic War thus contributed to creating solid relations 
between the Roman elites and many members of the Greek elites of 
Asia Minor, who were also the envoys of their own cities. Secondly, 
the results obtained by the Romans during the First Mithridatic War 
were still inconclusive, although Appian’s Μιθριδάτειος overlooks 
 
52 In the Pro Flacco, Cicero exploited the suspicion of μιθριδατισμός in order to 
accuse the Greeks of committing crimes, as we have already seen above.  
53 Str. 13.4.9 = 628. 
54 The source of much of this information is Strabo’s Geography. Strabo’s family 
had been tightly connected to the dynasty of Mithridates VI Eupator. See Bow-
ersock 2013, 380, 383; Kuin 2017. 
55 Bowersock 2013, 380, 383-384. 
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this fact, probably because it derives from Sulla’s own memoirs or 
from a source favourable to him.  
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